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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from the district court’s decision in Twin Falls County Case No. CV4220-1403. The district court determined that the pro se litigant’s lawsuit against his former public
defenders was outside of the statute of limitations. The district court dismissed the case.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below/Statement of Facts.

On April 10, 2020, Plaintiff/Appellant Dustin Mark Johnston (“Johnston”) filed a lawsuit
against an individual who had been appointed by the court to represent him in his criminal
proceedings, Alan J. Boehme, and also Marilyn B Paul, the head of the local public defender’s
office (“Twin Falls Public Defenders”). R. 5-9. Accompanying the complaint was a Declaration
of Johnston (“Declaration”). R. 10-14. Within the Declaration, Johnston stated that on April 14,
2017, a member of the Twin Falls Public Defenders office was appointed to represent him on
criminal charges brought against him. Johnston alleges that his appointed public defender did not
regularly communicate with him, that Johnston relayed his concerns about the police officer’s
body camera being turned on and off and muted, but that the appointed public defender told him
that it was a civil matter.
Also within the Declaration, Johnston states that on October 3, 2017, the first day of his
jury trial, he met with his appointed defender, alerting him to new police reports. That during his
criminal trial his appointed attorney did not object to evidence, did not file pretrial motions, or call
witnesses on Johnston’s behalf.
On May 15, 2020, the Twin Falls Public Defenders filed a Motion to Dismiss and Request
for Judicial Notice. R. 15-16. A memorandum was filed in support of the motion (R. 17-22)
arguing that Johnston failed to file his lawsuit within the statutory limitations of action. The
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Request for Judicial Notice was a request to take notice of Johnston’s underlying criminal case,
Twin Falls County Case No. CR42-17-3517, particularly, the date of the complaint, the first date
of the trial, the date of the denial of pro se request for a new trial, the date of appearance by new
counsel, and the date of sentencing.
In Plaintiff’s Objection and Response to Defendants, Motion to Take Judicial Notice filed
June 5, 2020 (R. 23-32) (“Plaintiff’s Objection”), Johnston demanded that the entire criminal file
should be judicially noticed, not simply specific documents.

Within Plaintiff’s Objection,

Johnston notes that, “[o]n or about December 2017, Plaintiff hires Attorney Darren McKenzie to
file his direct appeal and do his sentencing.” R. 26. Johnston included in Plaintiff’s Objection a
Register of Action for Twin Falls County Case No.CV-18-5078 (R. 44-52) concerning his postconviction relief matter. The post-conviction matter was filed on December 13, 2017, and another
public defender was appointed on December 14, 2017. R. 45.
On July 27, 2020, the district court granted Judicial Notice of Certain Matters (R. 59-61)
and on July 28, 2020, granted the Motion to Dismiss (R. 62-63) and Judgment (R. 64- 65). Johnston
filed a timely Notice of Appeal on August 10, 2020. R. 66-69).
C.

Standard of Review.

When reviewing the district court's order granting a motion to dismiss, the standard of
review is the same as that used in summary judgment. Yu v. Idaho State Univ., 165 Idaho 313, 316,
444 P.3d 885, 888 (2019); In re City of Shelley, 151 Idaho 289, 291, 255 P.3d 1175, 1177
(2011); Gibson v. Ada Cnty., 142 Idaho 746, 751, 133 P.3d 1211, 1216 (2006).
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and
admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled
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to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Yu, supra; McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228,
232, 61 P.3d 585, 589 (2002).
II.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
A. Whether the district court correctly determined that Johnston’s lawsuit was outside the
two-year statute of limitations of Idaho Code § 5-219.
B. Whether taking judicial notice that on a particular date, a particular pleading was filed,
changes a motion to dismiss to one of summary judgment.
C. If the failure to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment in
order to take judicial notice was in error, whether this Court may affirm the lower
court’s decision on other grounds.
III.
ARGUMENT
A.

Johnston’s civil complaint was filed later than allowed by Idaho Code § 5219(4), which requires a lawsuit be brought within two years after some
damage has occurred.

Johnston brought his complaint shortly after the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision
in Shubert v. Ada Cty., 166 Idaho 458, 461 P.3d 740 (2020), which determined that Idaho public
defenders were not entitled to either common law or statutory immunity for actions brought against
them while in their capacities as court-appointed counsel. A remaining defense for a public
defender is whether the plaintiff timely filed his claim within the limits found in Chapter 2, Title 5
of the Idaho Code.
Idaho Code § 5-219(4) sets forth the time limits for professional malpractice. “An action
to recover damages for ‘professional malpractice’ must be commenced within two years after the
cause of action has accrued.” Walsh v. Swapp L., PLLC, 166 Idaho 629, 636, 462 P.3d 607, 614
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(2020), citing Minnick v. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, 157 Idaho 863, 866, 341 P.3d
580, 583 (2015).
The Walsh v. Swapp decision explained when a cause of action would accrue, stating:
… a malpractice cause of action cannot begin to accrue until “some damage” has
occurred. City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 659, 201 P.3d 629, 632 (2009)
(citing Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 254, 678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984)). The
“some damage” requirement reflects the simple understanding that a plaintiff must
prove damages in order to succeed on a claim of negligence. Id. (“[S]ome damage
is required because it would be nonsensical to hold that a cause of action is barred
by the statute of limitations before that cause of action even accrues.”). In other
words, “Idaho Code section 5-219(4)’s] accrual standard operates under a
completed tort theory in that the cause of action accrues when the tort is completed,
an event that corresponds with the first objectively ascertainable occurrence of
some damage.” Minnick, 157 Idaho at 867, 341 P.3d at 584. The “objectively
ascertainable damage” standard is “an additional analytical tool” to determine when
“some damage” occurs. Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482, 487, 835 P.2d 1293,
1298 (1992).
Walsh v. Swapp L., PLLC, 166 Idaho at 636–637, 462 P.3d at 614–615.
Johnston’s complaint and Declaration gave the following information: that a public
defender (Boehme) was appointed to defend him on his criminal charges on April 14, 2017, and
his criminal jury trial began on October 3, 2017. No other dates were contained in either document
directly concerning when the identified Twin Falls Public Defenders last acted on his behalf.
Later information provided in Plaintiff’s Opposition establishes a post-conviction
proceeding was initiated on December 13, 2017, and another public defender was appointed for
him on December 14, 2017. The filing of a post-conviction proceeding necessarily implies a
conviction.
When Johnston filed his civil complaint on April 14, 2020, alleging his public defender
mishandled his criminal charges in 2017, he filed too late under Idaho Code § 5-219(4).

Any

“occurrence of some damage” had to have occurred prior to the December 13, 2017, postconviction filing.
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Johnston attempted to argue that the correct time to begin the running of the statute of
limitations was when he discovered his public defender’s misconduct, citing Bliss Valley Food,
Inc., v. Walker, 127 Idaho 12, 896 P.2d 338 (1991). However, Walsh v. Swapp L., PLLC, supra,
specifically addressed the “date of discovery” concept and limited it to fraudulent concealment,
which was not pled by Johnston.
The lower court correctly dismissed Johnston’s civil complaint against Twin Falls Public
Defenders. Twin Falls Public Defenders request this appellate Court to reaffirm the lower court’s
determination.
B.

Taking judicial notice of specific dates for the purpose of determining whether
Plaintiff’s complaint was outside the statute of limitations falls within Rule of
Evidence 201(b) which allows a court to take judicial notice of a fact the
accuracy of which cannot be reasonably questioned and does not transform
the matter into a summary judgment proceeding.

The central issue before the lower court was when was the last date Twin Falls Public
Defenders caused “some damage” to Johnston, beginning the running of the limitations of action.
In his Declaration contemporaneously filed with his complaint, Johnston referenced his
criminal charges when he stated that the defendant public defender (Boehme) was appointed on
April 14, 2017. Another reference in his Declaration was October 3, 2017, the first day of his trial.
References made in the pleading for the purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) allows the lower court to
utilize Idaho Rule of Evidence 201, which allows a court to take judicially notice a fact that is not
subject to reasonable dispute because it; (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial
jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned. I.R.E. 201(b).
Twin Falls Public Defenders requested the lower court to take judicial notice of the
Register of Action for the underlying criminal case against Johnston, wherein a public defender
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was appointed on April 14, 2017 and the jury trial began on October 3, 2017. R. 19. The third
date of importance is that of December 12, 2017, when a new attorney appeared on Johnston’s
behalf. Obviously, Mr. Boehme had no role after December 12, 2017.
Other jurisdictions have determined that taking notice of a public record does not transform
a motion to dismiss into a summary judgment proceeding. “On a motion to dismiss, we may
take judicial notice of matters of public record outside the pleadings.” Mack v. South Bay Beer
Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir.1986); the Court may take judicial notice of “matters
of public record” without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.
MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986) which was later cited by
Gordon v. Impulse Mktg. Grp., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1044 (E.D. Wash. 2005). Accord,
Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n. 9 (5th Cir.2007) (“it is clearly proper in deciding a
12(b)(6) motion to take judicial notice of matters of public record.”).
It should be noted that Johnston did not object to the request to take judicial notice of the
Register of Actions in the underlying criminal case, but demanded that the entire underlying
criminal file be considered.
Asking a court to consider a court record solely for the purpose of establishing that specific
matters occurred on specific dates does not transform a motion to dismiss into a summary judgment
proceeding.
C.

If the Court determines the Motion to Dismiss was a Motion for Summary
Judgment, that should not prevent this Court from affirming the lower court’s
decision.

Johnston argues that when a court considers matters outside the pleadings, the motion to
dismiss is converted into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, which requires an
opportunity to present pertinent materials. Appellant Brief, p. 3, I.R.C.P. 12(d).
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Twin Falls Public Defenders point out that materials presented in Plaintiff’s Opposition
and statements made in his Declaration establish that “some damage” (if any) done by his courtappointed attorney could not have occurred later than December 14, 2017, when another public
defender was appointed to handle his post-conviction proceeding. There was no need for the court
to look outside the materials filed in this case to determine that Johnston filed his civil lawsuit too
late.
The latest discussion of harmless error by the Supreme Court is found in Frizzell v.
DeYoung, 167 Idaho 801, 477 P.3d 236 (decided December 4, 2020). To provide an extensive
excerpt from the Court’s decision:
“Unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence,
or any other error by the court or a party, is ground for granting a new trial, for
setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order. At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all
errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights.” I.R.C.P. 61.
“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless the ruling is a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and a
substantial right of the party is affected.” Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co.,
127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995) (citing I.R.E. 103; I.R.C.P.
61). Error that does not affect a substantial right is considered harmless and is
disregarded. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 797, 53 P.3d 1211, 1216 (2002)
(citing I.R.C.P. 61; Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 50–51,
995 P.2d 816, 820–21 (2000)).
Frizzell v. DeYoung, 167 Idaho at 806, 477 P.3d at 241.
This Court’s standard of review is the same as for a motion for summary judgment. The
question is whether Johnston filed his civil lawsuit within the two-year period. His own materials
establish that a post-conviction proceeding was filed on December 13, 2017, and another public
defender appointed December 14, 2017. Either of these dates would be the very latest that “some
damage” occurred under Idaho Code § 5-219(4) against the Twin Falls Public Defenders.
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Johnston must establish that his substantial rights were affected by the lower court styling
its ruling as a dismissal. Johnston argues that he was denied a chance to present all materials made
pertinent to a summary judgment motion. Appellant Brief, p. 3. However, what else can be
presented once he produced his post-conviction litigation Register of Actions in this proceeding?
Johnston cites Bliss Valley Food, Inc., v. Walker, supra, as holding the date of discovery as the
standard to determine whether his civil lawsuit was filed too late. However, he fails to distinguish
Walsh v. Swapp L., PLLC, supra, which limits Bliss Valley Foods to fraudulent concealment.
Johnston fails to argue that Walsh was improperly decided.
“When the trial court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, we will affirm the
result on the correct theory.” Tricore Invs., LLC v. Est. of Warren through Warren, No. 46912,
2021 WL 1395903, at *17 (Idaho Apr. 14, 2021), citing Nicholson v. Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining
Corp., 161 Idaho 877, 881, 392 P.3d 1218, 1222 (2017).
Johnston’s pro se civil lawsuit provided scant details concerning the relevant dates to
determine the last date when some damage occurred. Johnston provided details in later materials
that could have been considered by the lower court, without taking judicial notice of the underlying
criminal case.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In light of the above, the Court should uphold the lower court’s determination that Idaho
Code § 5-219(4) begins when some damage occurs. In this matter, the “some damage” occurred
no later than December 14, 2017, when Johnston was appointed another public defender to handle
his post-conviction application. When Johnston filed his civil lawsuit against the Respondent
Twin Falls Public Defenders on April 14, 2020, he filed too late.
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The judicial notice of a Register of Action does not transform a motion to dismiss since
Johnston referenced most of the dates. Even if the motion to dismiss should have been treated as
a motion for summary judgment, it should be considered harmless error.
Under the appellate standard of review, Twin Falls Public Defenders are entitled to prevail
on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of June, 2021.
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
BY:

/s/ Michael J. Kane
MICHAEL J. KANE
Attorney for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4th day of June, 2021, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:
__XX__ U.S. Mail
_______ Email
_______ iCourt eFile

Plaintiff Pro Se
Dustin Mark Johnston
SAWC #78202
St. Anthony’s Work Center
125 N. 8th W.
St. Anthony, ID 83445

/s/ Michael J. Kane
MICHAEL J. KANE
Attorney for Defendants
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